been embraced by a wide range of disciplines such as environmental psychology, architecture, geography, city planning, computer science, cognitive science, and others. Major new works continue to appear (e.g., Devlin, 2001; Golledge, 1999; Golledge & Stimson, 1997) .
Part of the success of environmental cognition inquiry is due to the wide scope of the research. Whereas some researchers have proposed a relatively constrained definition, focusing on spatial knowledge, others have seen environmental cognition as a more inclusive process of learning about the world, giving it meaning, and taking action in it (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982) . Also, in addition to its theoretical importance, environmental cognition has been seen as underpinning actions such as wayfinding and as an important component in understanding such diverse phenomena as creating lively streets used by pedestrians and facilitating emergency egress during emergencies (Devlin, 2001) .
As with many multidisciplinary fields, however, communication among researchers is uneven. The purpose of this special issue is to explore how cognitive science, environment and behavior studies 1 , and space syntax have approached the study of environmental cognition and to suggest ways that cross-fertilization might help advance this work. Earlier versions of most of the articles were first presented at the Third International Space Syntax Symposium, held at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, in May 2001. One of the goals of the symposium was to explore how the rigorous definitions and measurement of the physical world that have characterized space syntax theory and research could contribute to other disciplines. The first three articles were keynote papers; the final two were presented in the session on cognition. We are also particularly fortunate to include an additional short article written by Sonit Bafna of the Georgia Institute of Technology that serves as a "space syntax primer" for those unfamiliar with space syntax theories, methods, and concepts; an edited version of the excellent glossary of space syntax terms, originally written by Peponis, Wineman, Rashid, Bafna, and Kim (1998) to accompany the 1997 release of their Spatialist © software, is included as part of the space syntax primer.
For the purposes of this issue we are primarily focusing on how people acquire, store, and represent information about directions, distances, and locations in the large-scale physical world. (By large-scale, we are referring to spaces that are of a scale that cannot be perceived all at once, the "space of navigation," as Tversky refers to in her article in this issue.) Nonetheless, even within these boundaries the range of approaches is complex, and communication is not always smooth. However, the historical foci of the fields suggest opportunity for synergy. For example, space syntax research has a long-standing tradition of rigorous measurement of the layout of physical settings and observation of people moving through it; environment and behavior studies have examined self-report behavior such as think-aloud protocols and sketch maps as well as movement in real-world settings; cognitive science has explored and modeled cognitive processes. In the following section, we review three areas that provide special opportunities for future collaboration.
AREAS FOR FUTURE COLLABORATION
The articles in this issue and emerging work in the three disciplines point to several themes in environmental cognition research to which interdisciplinary collaborations might make a valuable contribution: (a) understanding the relationships between the form of the physical world and mental representations, (b) linking space to action, and (c) creating alternative methods and approaches for studying environmental cognition.
UNDERSTANDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FORM OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
Since the early development of environmental cognition, researchers have suggested that there is some degree of isomorphism between the physical world and our mental representations of it-that these representations are organized in ways that preserve relationships in the physical world (Lynch, 1960; Moore & Golledge, 1976) .
2 This isomorphism is both in the content of mental representations and their layout. Content is often described as higherlevel descriptors that are not simple elements but rather are understandable in terms of the use and meaning of the environment. For example, in his classic work, Lynch (1960) argued that cognitive maps can be defined in terms of landmarks, paths, nodes, districts, and edges.
Isomorphism at the level of layout asserts that cognitive representations have relationships among parts that are present in the physical world. These relationships can be topological-such as between or next to-or can be metric, preserving distance and direction. Not surprisingly, most researchers have found that cognitive representations, or their presumed externalizations such as sketch maps, are often distorted and stretched. However, these distortions are often systematic. For example, several researchers have argued that mental representations are organized hierarchically, with pairs of locations Zimring, Dalton / SPACE, COGNITION, AND ACTION 5 within a given region (i.e., downtown) being viewed as being closer to each other than to other locations in different regions (Golledge, 1999) . Similarly, locations within a region might be deemed to be relatively closer to "anchor points" that are visually or functionally important (Golledge & Stimson, 1997) . In their article in this issue, Kuipers, Tecuci, and Stankiewicz explore the development of "skeletons" that some experienced wayfinders seem to use to organize their cognitive representation. For example, taxi drivers and others who regularly traverse a city often orient themselves in terms of the major roads that they use most frequently while traveling. Specific locations are understood in terms of their relationships to these routes.
The isomorphism between cognitive representation and physical world seems also to develop in predictable ways as people become more familiar with settings. Often people learn topology first and then develop more coordinated metric relationships later. For example, one might know that a shopping center is beyond the school but not know how far. That the short-term pattern of development of a cognitive representation appears to follow a pattern similar to child development has proven particularly interesting to researchers (Evans & Pezdek, 1980) . Likewise, researchers have proposed that overall higher-level descriptors such as legibility (Lynch, 1960) , complexity (Weisman, 1981) , or intelligibility (Hillier, 1996) predict the accuracy of people's mental representations. These studies explore the intuitive if somewhat circular notion that people seem to have greater difficulty representing complex settings. However, these issues have also proven difficult to define in precise terms. For example, whereas Weisman (1981) asked judges to assess the relative complexity of floor-plan patterns, the underlying geometric qualities that predict complexity were unclear. A handful of other environment and behavior researchers have attempted to define overall complexity in more quantitative ways. For example, O'Neill (1991) found that participants had more difficulty representing routes through and sketching settings that had a greater ratio of nodes to connections.
The persistent difficulty in environment and behavior literature has been the problem of rigorously defining the layout of the physical world, either in terms of relationships among parts or overall complexity. Certainly, more experienced wayfinders can often produce sketch maps that are more detailed and are more like printed maps, but what qualities of the physical world are most accurately preserved? What do these accuracies and distortions tell us about the processes of environmental cognition? What do they tell us about how to create settings that people can easily understand?
As is discussed in several articles in this issue, space syntax theories and methods provide a potentially important opportunity to provide rigorous, quantitative values for some of the qualities of the physical setting that environmental cognition researchers have been struggling with. The qualities can be represented as simple graphs and assigned quantities using well-defined methods. These graphs and quantities can be compared between settings. (See the articles in this issue by Bafna, Penn, and Haq and Zimring for more discussion.) These measures can also be compared with the comparable measures of sketch maps (see Haq & Zimring, 2003, and Penn, 2003 [this issue] ). In addition, space syntax theory allows the analysis of different scales of topological structures: how local features relate, how groups of features relate, and how features relate to the structure of a large, complex setting such as a city or large building.
LINKING SPACE TO ACTION
Environmental cognition researchers have long explored the relationships between cognition and action (see e.g., Garling & Evans, 1991; Golledge, 1999) . The articles in this issue and others in this field suggest multiple relationships. Instrumentally, if a person has a good understanding of a setting, he or she can presumably find his or her way with fewer errors. If the person understands metric distances and directions, he or she can take shortcuts because the person knows which direction to go at a choice point. More broadly, the understanding of a setting can influence other kinds of navigation, such as when people explore a setting to understand the "lay of the land" (see Haq & Zimring, 2003 [this issue]) . It can also influence how people explore a setting for pleasure (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982) .
Environmental cognition might also predict larger-scale phenomena such as why people can be found walking in some spaces. An important insight in space syntax theory is that the presence of people is a significant social and cultural phenomenon. Active, inhabited spaces and streets are often safer and more interesting and help create a sense of community (Hillier, 1996) . As Penn (2003 [this issue]) suggests, the explanation for people's presence may be that something about their understanding of the setting influences them to choose those spaces. Specifically, it might be that people develop an understanding of the local and global structure of a setting, as Haq and Zimring (2003 [this issue]) suggest, or that they develop emergent understandings of structure such as skeletons. As Tversky (2003 [this issue] ) suggests in her article, this knowledge appears to be conditioned by the relationship to the body and body plane.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS AND APPROACHES FOR STUDYING ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION
Cognitive science, space syntax, and environment and behavior studies bring different methods to the study of environmental cognition. As in Kuipers et al. (2003 [this issue]) , cognitive scientists often have created formal models of wayfinding behavior that allow larger structures and patterns to emerge. Other cognitive science researchers, such as Tversky (2003 [this issue] ), measure reaction time to investigate information processing. Space syntax research has developed quantitative descriptors of the topological form of settings that are good predictors of where people will be found walking. Environment and behavior researchers have developed tools such as sketch maps, think-aloud protocols, and tracking of individuals.
There are some clear opportunities for synergy. As several of the articles in this issue illustrate, the spatial description tools of syntax can be applied to other patterns such as the layout of sketch maps and search behavior. The modeling precision of cognitive science can be applied to the real-world settings that environment and behavior researchers study. Although cognitive science researchers tend to be concerned with cognitive processes rather than designing good environments, the greater precision in defining the independent variable that syntax provides can also be applied to cognitive science.
ARTICLES IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
In his article, Penn presents the stimulating argument that the very manner in which people cognize their environment and make behavioral decisions is implicit within the analytic techniques employed by space syntax researchers. He argues that this is why space syntax measures such as integration or connectivity are such good predictors of the presence of people walking. (These measures often predict 50% or more of the variance without requiring any other information about the functions of spaces.)
Penn seeks to transform what he describes as the "predictive" theory of space syntax into an "explanatory" theory, a goal that may only be achieved by beginning to broach the "black box" that is the individual and to question how certain small-scale behaviors may be aggregated such that they produce the emergent phenomenon of pedestrian movement. In particular, he seeks to resolve why the axial map (and to a lesser extent the measure of mean depth) has been so effective in predicting navigational patterns. To make this link between the individual and the population, he reviews a selection of recent space syntax research, including his own, and draws connections to pertinent work from the fields of cognition, psychology, and neuroscience. This review ultimately leads Penn to formulate an argument for the substantiation of the axial line, which arises from contemplating the differential flow of visual information while traversing a complex environment.
The thread of his argument is as follows: Penn starts by discussing Gibson, who effectively turned the navigation/vision syzygy on its head by stating that instead of vision enabling navigation, we navigate to better comprehend our immediate environment. Furthermore, Gibson suggested that environmental cognition is impossible without the act of traversing an environment. However, the crux of Penn's argument is about being strategically efficient; it is essentially a question of making a trade-off between local visual information (which can be seen from a single standpoint) and global visual information (visual data of the rest of the environment). To be efficient, a person navigating must maximize their acquisition of global information while minimizing local information, achieved by recognizing when they already comprehend enough about their immediate surroundings and hence intuitively seek the next key location that permits a sudden increase in novel environmental data. This would be consistent with the fact that when people were lost in unintelligible virtual worlds, they continued through the segregated streets, stopping only to scrutinize their environment when they emerged at an information-rich location that had long lines of sight and large visual fields and was syntactically integrated and far from any occluding surfaces (Conroy, 2001 ). In essence, Penn's argument for the use of the axial line is that it represents the set of most efficient potential paths through an environment with respect to the accruing of maximum visual information about that context.
Here, one may begin to draw a connection to the next article, presented by Tversky, and specifically to the section of her article where she discusses the space of navigation. She states that in the mental constructions that people create of the spaces through which they move, "Certain information, such as exact metric information, is systematically simplified and even distorted" (p. 71). She further clarifies, "Directions and axes are not represented analogically or metrically in exact degrees or meters but rather somewhat categorically. It is this schematization into elements and paths relative to reference frames that allows integration of fragments into a whole" (p. 72). A number of links may be made between Tversky's mental spaces of navigation and Penn's descriptions of the axial map. First, the axial map might be interpreted as forming an overarching framework in a manner akin to Tversky's reference frames. Second, she continues by citing research that she and her colleagues (Denis, 1997; Tversky & Lee, 1998 , 1999 conducted into the structure of route directions. She states that among other components, they consisted of "sequences of segments of reorientations." Hence, it could be said that an axial line is precisely a "segment of reorientation;" the crossing or intersection of any two axial lines indicates a location at which a change of direction may be made. Third, the axial map is nonmetric; it represents topological space, namely, a sequence of relationships. In Penn's article, he explains thus, "No direct account is taken of the metric properties of space, and the analysis . . . reduces the effects of metric distance to a minimum and places the most emphasis on the average number of changes of direction encountered on routes" (p. 31). This approach is also mirrored in the article by Kuipers et al., where they describe an aspect of the spatial semantic hierarchy (SSH)-the SSH topological map, being a bipartite map that illustrates the set of relationships between locations and the various paths linking those locations. They state, "the benefit of the bipartite graph of places and paths is that physically distant places on the same path may be close in the topological map, making wayfinding easier" (p. 83).
As well as discussing the spaces of navigation, Tversky also introduces the following three other types of space: the space of the body, the space around the body, and the space of graphics. In the section on the space of the body, she discusses various factors that may contribute to our mental representations of the body, concluding that such representations are strongly influenced by the functional significance of various body parts. In the section entitled "The Space Around the Body," she suggests that mental representations of local, small-scale space can be structured around extensions of the three major axes of the body, these axes being head/feet, front/back, and left/ right. Through a discussion of relevant experimental data she demonstrates a hierarchy implicit in these axes, the weakest being the left/right axis due to the symmetry of this axis. Tversky concludes by drawing together all of these various mental spaces and summarizing that all behavior takes place simultaneously in any number of these spaces (and suggests that there are many more). Tversky's (2002) discussion of the role that the frame of reference, "[the] schematization, into elements and paths relative to reference frames," (p. 72) plays in the composition of what she pleasingly terms the cognitive collage (as opposed to cognitive map) can also be considered analogous to the skeleton in the article by Kuipers et al., "The Skeleton in the Cognitive Map." Kuipers et al.' s definition of the skeleton is a subset of paths, or oligarchy, within a complex environment that is used with greater frequency than the rest of the paths. The reason why this can be held to be an example of a frame of reference, as per Tversky's definition, is due to the role that Kuipers et al. propose that such a skeleton is used during wayfinding. They suggest that expert users, when plotting a route from A to B, will first find a route connecting their starting location, A, to the nearest accessible point on the skeleton. The second stage will be to move along the skeleton until a point is reached that is in close proximity to the destination B (assuming, of course, that B is not already on the skeleton). Finally, the third part of the route is plotted, a route connecting the skeleton to place B. Certainly, this could be regarded as an example of finding "elements and paths relative to reference frames."
Kuipers et al. continue their article by proposing a hypothesis that the skeleton is an emergent phenomenon, one that is formed through the cognition of boundary relations in an environment (boundary relations being the relationship between places and paths; such relations as to the left of, to the right of, and on are considered). They suggest that as we move through an environment we notice and store sets of boundary relations and that those paths that are rich in such boundary relations become the paths that are more likely to be used in the future. In this way, a feedback loop is formed, with the more popular routes becoming ever more popular over time, and hence the skeleton emerges.
There is an interesting connection here to space syntax, and in particular the measure that Penn discusses in his paper, mean depth or integration.
3 In space syntax terms, it could be suggested that the pattern formed by the most integrated axial lines in a system could be analogous to the skeleton as described by Kuipers et al. Consider for a moment the idea of an oligarchy, or a system dominated by a few. In Kuipers et al.'s example, theirs is a system comprising of relationships-in their terms, boundary relations. Therefore, we have a system of relationships dominated by a small subset of elements that develops over time, with the dominant elements becoming ever the more dominant-the rich get richer.
This description bears remarkable similarity to the phenomenon of scalefree networks described by Barabási (2002) . Scale-free networks are networks dominated by a few highly connected nodes and where the frequency of connections follows a power-law distribution (a few nodes with high connections decreasing to many nodes with a small number of connections). If you plot the frequency distributions of either axial line length or connectivity (how many other lines an axial line intersects), then the resultant graph is a power curve consisting of very few, long, well-connected lines and many short, sparsely connected lines. Hillier (2001) noted that the number of lines when ordered by line length in the upper decile of the distribution are 2%, 5%, 3%, and 2% for four sample cities, that is to say, a small number of long and highly connected lines. He further noted that this pattern becomes reinforced the larger a city grows. In other words, the spatial network of cities appears to be precisely the kind of scale-free graph that Barabási described. Such long, well-connected lines tend to be the center-to-edge lines or the Zimring, Dalton / SPACE, COGNITION, AND ACTION 11 major arterial roads, which as a city expands are the roads that are typically extended outward and on which new development is focused. Again, this reflects one of Barabási's criteria for scale-free graphs: preferential growth.
This structure inherent in the axial map could be providing the type of skeleton that Kuipers and his colleagues are describing. In space syntax terms, the skeleton would consist of those paths that due to their accessibility from the entire system are more likely to constitute a substantial subcomponent of any route (given a high number of random origin and destination pairs). However, Kuipers et al. pose the pertinent question, "Is there a qualitative difference between the skeleton and the rest of the map, or is the role of the skeleton an emergent behavior of some uniform mechanism applied to the entire cognitive map?" (p. 81). In this respect, the approach of space syntax researchers and Kuipers et al. must by necessity diverge, for space syntax researchers would view the skeleton as being intrinsic to the spatial configuration of the system (a given state) in contrast to the approach by Kuipers et al., where the skeleton is viewed as a phenomena that emerges over time from the cumulative experience of navigating an environment. (We suggest that over time, were the skeleton as described by Kuipers et al. allowed to develop until it reaches a steady state, the resultant structure would resemble the space syntax equivalent.) Kuipers et al.' s primary research interest is in establishing and providing rules for robots navigating through environments and focusing on the way in which these robots acquire an internal representation (cognitive map) of the environment. These approaches afford valuable insights into the role that visual perception and cognition plays in the processes of navigation, movement, and wayfinding. In the second half of their article, Kuipers et al. use the hypothesis they have formed about the functional role of the skeleton in wayfinding to provide a set of rules to guide a software robot or agent through an environment. Once the agent has completed a learning phase, they test for the presence of a skeleton by examining the pattern of frequency of use for all the paths in the environment. They then perform wayfinding tests in a virtual world on both human participants and agents and compare the results. One research interest that they reveal was to question whether participants randomly chose one path over another (where there was more than one equally cost-efficient path) or whether they chose paths with more boundary relations. They were also interested in determining whether their agent, once trained, could predict the human participants' next moves. They found that the agent was able to reliably anticipate human route choice decisions, that the frequency distributions of path usage for both the agent and the humans suggested the presence of an underlying skeleton, and that given a choice of equally efficient routes, people tended to select routes with a higher number of boundary relations.
Such a method of investigating the processes of navigation and wayfinding by setting up experiments in virtual environments and allowing people to navigate through a three-dimensional, simulated world in order to track their movements and examine their route selection choices was also an approach used by the author of the next article in this issue, Dalton. Similar to Kuipers et al., Dalton was also interested in the kinds of decisions that people made while navigating and in particular the route choice decisions that people make at road junctions. She created an environment in which participants were presented with a variety of different junction types and then noted the sequence of decisions made at each junction encountered. Her hypothesis was that the angle of rotation made at a junction constituted a key factor in the decision-making process and that furthermore, angles that deviated least from a continuous straight heading were preferable to sharp turns. At every junction, she tested each decision made by a participant against the set of all possible decisions (available at that specific location) and against a randomly generated decision. All decisions were considered purely in terms of the differing angles of rotation required as compared to the participants' prior heading. She found strong evidence that participants tended to select routes that approximated a straight line and avoided routes that were particularly convoluted or meandering. She elaborates on her hypothesis by suggesting that the reason for this phenomenon is to reduce route complexity. However, she is forced to further adapt her hypothesis, formulating the British Library theory-namely, that route selection is a competition between the desire to select the simplest route (in angular terms) and the desire to maintain a heading closest to the direction of the destination from the origin. Furthermore, once the difference in angles becomes too great, the shortest route will always win out over the simplest . (p. 130) In effect, she produces an algorithm, which in turn could be used to program such navigating agents as Kuipers and his colleagues were using in their experiments.
The final article, by Haq and Zimring, is also concerned with tracking the wayfinding movements and decisions made by people, this time in a real rather than a virtual environment. Haq and Zimring conduct a series of wayfinding experiments in three hospitals and take account of measures of the behavior and resultant environmental cognition of the participants as well as measures of the environment itself (a large proportion of these being space Zimring, Dalton / SPACE, COGNITION, AND ACTION 13 syntax measures). One strong research finding of this article is the significant correlation between the frequency with which certain paths (axial lines) appeared on cognitive maps or sketch maps drawn by the participants and the connectivity values of the axial lines. This correlation lends considerable empirical weight to the earlier suggestion of a link between Kuipers et al.'s skeleton, Tversky's frame of reference, and the emergent structure of axial maps, dominated by a few lines (as per Barabási's [2002] scale-free graphs). Such a strong empirical finding is of great import with respect to providing common ground between researchers from different fields.
Another of Haq and Zimring's findings concerned their participants'gradual transition from a reliance on local environmental knowledge (that which may be apprehended from a single location) to global or configurational knowledge as they became more familiar with the setting. Again, this can be linked to the section of Penn's article concerned with the acquisition of global knowledge as weighed against potentially less useful local knowledge. Equally, another connection between concepts can be made by considering Haq and Zimring's description of how such spatial knowledge is constructed. They state, "This understanding of relationships gradually considers larger and larger systems as well as connectivities of greater and greater depth in its scope. In this manner, local information is assimilated into a global understanding" (p. 158). This assertion can be seen to share some parallels with Tversky's (2002) description of the cognitive collage. Tversky's description of the cognitive collage suggests that it consists of "mental representations of . . . large environments that are pieced together from different views or different modalitities . . . constructed from elements relative to a reference frame and a perspective" (p. 74). Both descriptions unite in the belief of a piecemeal construction, gradually cohering into an ever more robust mental representation of the spatial environment. Finally, in summarizing their findings, Haq and Zimring propose an elaboration of Hillier et al.'s (1993) theory of natural movement, which can be seen to mirror precisely the positive feedback loop of environmental cognition/wayfinding described and utilized by Kuipers et al. in their article. It is our hope that in this article we have been able to provide evidence of a numerous diversity of links and connections as well as larger swathes of common ground between the articles in this special issue. This is despite the fact that they originate from almost as many academic fields as there are articles presented here. These articles suggest that there are both methodological and substantive contributions that the fields can make to each other, ranging from using the precision of space syntax in describing the physical world to using cognitive science's computer modeling of behavior. What remains is to
